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STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Melvin G. Dakin*
OFFICERS AND POWERS
The recent flurry of rural hospital building prompted by the
availability of federal funds' has brought in its wake an expectable
maneuvering for the political posts involved. Giammanco v.
Pizzolato2 is illustrative. Existing state legislation gave the power to
appoint and remove commissioners of hospital service districts to the
appropriate police juries; pursuant thereto, appointments to commis-
sion posts were made by the police jury of the parish of St. Charles.3
The police jury then had second thoughts about two of its appointees
and sought to remove them by a simple two-thirds vote of the mem-
bership of the police jury. On judicial review, the Fourth Circuit held
that the legislature intended removal only for cause, not, as was
argued, removal by a two-thirds vote or for cause or both.' A constitu-
tional attack on the statute on the ground that the title contained no
reference to removal for cause was rejected, the court reasoning that
under the constitutional requirement a title need only be indicative
of the statute's object and not an index to, or as extensive as, the act
itself.5
In Edwards v. Munster,' the Governor had made appointments
to the Board of Commissioners of the Lake Borgne Basin Levee Dis-
trict. Thereafter the newly constituted board met, appointed a presi-
dent, and discharged the then secretary of the board. The discharged
secretary refused to give up the books and records to the newly
elected president and the board sought mandamus to turn over or
show cause to the contrary. A district court permitted the discharged
secretary to introduce evidence of the illegal composition of the board
but refused to allow petitioners to introduce evidence of their ap-
pointment; on appeal the reviewing court determined that the dis-
charged secretary, not a member of the board, had no right to raise
issues other than his claim to be secretary.7 Since no claimants to
membership had appeared in the suit to attack the right of the new
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University
1. See, e.g., "Medical Facilities Construction and Modernization Amendments of
1970", Pub. L. No. 91-296, 84 Stat. 336 (1970) (codified in titles 12, 21, 42 U.S.C.).
2. 275 So. 2d 880 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
3. LA. R.S. 46:1053 (1950).
4. 275 So. 2d at 882-83.
5. Id. at 883-84.
6. 269 So. 2d 580 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
7. Id. at 582.
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members to hold office and the discharged secretary was deemed
without status to litigate the rights of any such claimants, the matter
was remanded to the trial court solely for the purpose of trying the
issue as to turning over of the records. A proper showing of color of
title to the office was deemed all that was necessary to support such
a turn over order.'
In 1969, Louisiana adopted a so-called riot control act authoriz-
ing the chief executive officer of a political subdivision to request the
governor to proclaim a state of emergency within the political subdi-
vision; upon proclamation the chief law enforcement officer of the
political subdivision was authorized to promulgate such emergency
measures as curfew orders.' In State v. Gauthier,"0 our supreme court
held that the statute may not be construed to authorize the mayor-
president, who would be the chief executive office of East Baton
Rouge as a political subdivision, to promulgate a curfew order; that
could be done only by the chief of police as the chief law enforcement
officer for the political subdivision pursuant to the statute. As a con-
sequence the court affirmed a trial court judgment quashing a bill of
information against the defendant, for violation of a curfew order,
since the order was beyond the authority of the mayor-president to
issue."
The Department of Highways (representing predecessor Board of
Highways) compromised a claim for interest on deposits on the basis
of its general powers as a separate legal entity including the right to
sue and be sued. In State ex rel. Guste v. Board of Highways,"2 the
attorney general sought to restrain the board and department from
utilizing the funds received in settlement on the theory that final
responsibility to settle disputes involving state agencies rested with
the Attorney General pursuant to constitutional provision. In a deci-
sion affirming a district court dismissal of the attorney general's suit
the First Circuit recognized the general powers of the Attorney Gen-
eral under the constitutional provision as to all legal matters in which
the state has an interest. It followed prior jurisprudence, however, in
holding that where there is no allegation that a department, recog-
nized as a separate legal entity, has willfully violated public policy
of the state without action to correct the violation or has taken action
potentially tainted with fraud, the Attorney General has failed to
state a cause of action under the constitutional provision permitting
8. Id. at 582-83.
9. LA. R.S. 14:329.6 (Supp. 1969).
10. 263 La. 678, 269 So. 2d 204 (1972).
11. Id. at 682, 269 So.2d at 206.
12. 275 So. 2d 207 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
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him to supplant the department.'" The district court was also af-
firmed in its refusal as untimely a post-judgment amended petition
requesting that the funds be paid into the state treasury. 4
By statute, all bidders making proposals to furnish services or
materials to a public body are bound by published specifications and
where there is a substantial variance between specifications and bid,
the bid must be rejected; the law also precludes post-bid changes in
specifications. 5 In Toye 'Brothers Yellow Cab Co. v. City of New
Orleans, the court of appeal reviewed and approved similar proce-
dures used by the city in awarding a franchise for airport transporta-
tion. Forms utilized by the city provided inter alia a bid proposal and
required a separate document setting forth the qualifications of the
bidder and a further document setting forth the general terms and
conditions for the airport service. An unsuccessful bidder attacked
the award on the ground that the winner's original bid did not comply
with published specifications in failing to set forth as a part of the
bid proposal that he had the necessary facilities and was fully compe-
tent and experienced in the service." The court held that while such
qualifications might have been made a part of the published specifi-
cations, it was not sacramental that this be done and that the infor-
mation could properly be furnished separate and apart from the bid
proposal; the court thus found that there was no substantial variance
between specifications and bids and that consideration of the back-
ground information was a matter for the exercise of the agency discre-
tion. ' The court would not substitute its judgment for a good faith
judgment of an agency on such matters but would only insure that
the discretion was exercised in a fair and legal manner and not arbi-
trarily; absent proof of an abuse of discretion the court found no error
in the granting of the franchise.
In Walker v. Louisiana Expressway Authority,20 the Fourth Cir-
cuit upheld the validity of the "north-south" toll road legislation and
implementing resolutions by the authority against attacks on its con-
stitutionality based on the act having more than one object and a title
not indicative thereof.2' The attack on the resolution finding financial
13. Id. at 213-14.
14. Id. at 214.
15. LA. R.S. 38:2211 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1952, No. 370 § 1; 1954, No.
589 § 1; 1970, No. 274 § 1.
16. 264 So. 2d 768 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
17. Id. at 770.
18. Id. at 771-72.
19. Id. at 772.
20. 274 So. 2d 716 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
21. Id. at 720.
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feasibility centered on the alleged illegal inclusion of a ten per cent
contingency fund as an immediate increase of the sum authorized by
the legislature.22 The court rejected the argument that this was in-
tended only to protect against cost overruns after actual construction
was underway.2 The court also rejected attacks on the computation
of interest during construction, finding the method and elements
used in the calculation reasonable, though obviously the result of
expert appraisals by financial consultants. 4 The design as well was
found reasonable except for the width of median which required in-
crease to 64 feet to conform to the act which required "design...
at least comparable to those of existing interstate routes currently in
use . . ",25 In approving the reasonableness of projected revenues,
the court noted that
we do not serve our function in reviewing administrative factual
findings by selecting the better of two expert opinions based pri-
marily on judgment. We simply use the opinion of the attacking
expert to assist us in our determination of whether the adminis-
trative finding was without foundation in fact. Using this stan-
dard, we find that plaintiffs have failed to successfully attack the
study's conclusions as to the impact of the system on economic
growth.2 1
ELECTIONS
Louisiana jurisprudence has adhered to the doctrine that all elec-
tions and all matters relating to political rights strictly belong to the
political department of the government, and are therefore beyond the
control of the judicial power in the absence of special constitutional
or statutory authority.27 To further minimize the interference with
the political processes, except where the qualification of a candidate
is questioned, the courts have construed the statutes as providing for
only post-election judicial review of irregularities or fraud and such
review only as to alleged irregularities which would change the out-
come of the election.2'8 This approach was adhered to in Keating v.
22. Id. at 723-24.
23. Id. at 724.
24. Id. at 729.
25. Id. at 730-31.
26. Id. at 732.
27. Leblanc v. Democratic State Cent. Comm., 229 La. 556, 86 So. 2d 192 (1956).
28. Treadway v. Plaquemines Par. Demo. Comm., 193 So. 609 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1940), construing predecessor of LA. R.S. 18:364 (1950).
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St. John the Baptist Parish Democratic Executive Committee9
where an irregularity was complained of in connection with the ap-
pointment of election commissioners without setting forth full infor-
mation as to addresses, wards and precincts. A suit filed prior to the
election was held premature and it was noted that even post-election
suits would not be entertained if they did not allege an irregularity
which would change the outcome of the election.3" A concurring judge
called attention to injunction or other remedial writs being available
for the correction of irregularities at any time and would have permit-
ted the suit. 3'
In Cooper v. Broussard,32 the First Circuit construed the time
limit within which an election might be contested (expressed as
"within two days after official promulgation . . . by respective com-
mittees . . . . ,,3 as requiring the suit to be filed within 48 hours of
announcement of the results by the appropriate committee, not when
certification of the result of the election was made to the Secretary
of State.3 4 This was deemed in keeping with prior jurisprudence that
the purpose of promulgation was to give notice; announcement by the
committee was deemed to serve this purpose.35
The statutory time limitations on filing as an independent candi-
date for office were reviewed in Courtney v. Martin." While the statu-
tory language is unclear, the court concluded that an independent
seeking nomination in a general or regular election would have filed
timely if his papers were filed prior to a second primary but that this
would not be the case where the candidate was seeking nomination
in an election to fill a vacancy. In the latter case, the statutes provide
that nomination papers must be filed on or before the date of the first
primary. 7 A plausible case, on the basis of statutory construction,
was made for the more stringent requirement being applicable only
to vacancies occurring as to presidential electors since the limitation
appears in a paragraph clearly directed only to such electors; 38 it was
rejected on the somewhat specious ground that this was the only
29. 265 So. 2d 655 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
30. Id. at 657.
31. Id. at 657-58. It is to be noted however that a petition for injunction would
entail an allegation of irreparable injury and inadequacy of the remedy normally
provided. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 2601.
32. 266 So. 2d 549 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
33. LA. R.S. 18:364(H) (1950).
34. 266 So. 2d at 551.
35. Id. at 552.
36. 267 So. 2d 595 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
37. LA. R.S. 18:627 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1952, No. 43 § 1.
38. Id.
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language in the general election law addressed specifically to filling
vacancies and hence must apply. 9
REFERENDUMS
A number of cases involving procedural issues in the conduct of
referendums reached the courts of appeal during last term including
Crews v. Cappell" where injunctive relief was sought against a local
option stock law, claiming irregularities in the petition for a referen-
dum election. No specific statutory provisions governed judicial re-
view of the matter" and the court accorded review by analogy from
other local option laws in Louisiana and neighboring states.2 As
noted, irregularities in elections generally must be raised in a post-
election suit and then only if the outcome of the election could be
affected thereby;4 3 as to the referendum here, the court ruled that
post-election challenge of irregularities in procedures preceding elec-
tion would not be permitted on the basis of mere technical irregulari-
ties which could have been raised prior to the election; here failure
on the part of some fifteen per cent of petitioners to date their signa-
tures."
A court of appeal has indicated a willingness to uphold a legisla-
tive cure of deficiencies in a home rule charter adopted by referendum
in Gautreaux v. City of Baker.5 A city court was inadvertently cre-
ated in a home rule charter prior to constitutionally required specific
authorization by the legislature; thereafter, the legislature adopted a
ratifying and confirming statute and proposed a constitutional
amendment to ratify and confirm the court as well.46 Although the
amendment was defeated, in view of the constitutional authority in
the legislature, the court of appeal held that legislative ratification
was adequate to validate the creation of the city court in the home
rule charter. 7
In Charter Commission of the City of Alexandria v. Karst," our
supreme court was unwilling to construe a statutory grant for creation
of a charter commission charged with submission of a charter within
39. 267 So. 2d at 598.
40. 277 So. 2d 150 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
41. LA. R.S. 3:3001-14 (Supp. 1958).
42. 277 So. 2d at 153-54.
43. See note 28 supra.
44. 277 So. 2d at 154.
45. 270 So. 2d 221 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 272 So. 2d 337 (La. 1973).
46. Id. at 223.
47. Id.
48. 272 So. 2d 348 (La. 1973).
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one year after appointment as authorizing the commission to draft a
second charter after the year had expired and the electorate had
rejected a first charter submitted within such year.49 While a charter
commission must be appointed for a four-year term under the stat-
ute, its meaningful existence for the purpose of submitting amend-
ments to a charter was deemed dependent upon a charter being
drafted and accepted by the electorate within its first year of exist-
ence; the court theorized that the statute contemplated that once a
proposed charter had been framed and rejected by the electorate,
another and differently constituted commission would more likely
frame an acceptable charter thereafter."
ZONING
The First Circuit Court of Appeal presumably wrote a final chap-
ter to litigation over the re-zoning of land in Villa Del Rey Citizens
Association v. City of Baton Rouge.51 The court had previously up-
held a petition for declaratory judgment as an appropriate procedure
to test the legality of a re-zoning ordinance even though not coupled
with the prayer for injunctive relief which would render the proceed-
ing summary in character.52 A companion case established the legal-
ity of the zoning action but no attack had been made on the ordinance
as an unconstitutional delegation of power, devoid of sufficient guide-
lines and standards to insure freedom from discriminatory applica-
tion.5" On remand of the first case, this constitutional attack was
made and rejected by the trial court. The court has now affirmed that
the standards and guidelines contained in the ordinance are adequate
to insure non-discriminatory treatment of zoning applications.54
Issues of both fact and law in zoning cases have traditionally
been fully reviewed by the courts on appeal, probably wisely since
both testimony and argument are often emotional and self-serving.
In Jemison v. City of Kenner,5 5 a re-zoning application was rejected
and the decision was attacked as arbitrary and capricious. The court
held that a rejection was unreasonable and therefore capricious and
arbitrary where based on the self-serving wishes of some citizens but
49. Id. at 352-53.
50. Id. at 353.
51. 273 So. 2d 574 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
52. Villa Del Rey Citizens Association v. City of Baton Rouge, 233 So. 2d 566 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1970).
53. Smith v. City of Baton Rouge, 233 So. 2d 569 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
54. 273 So. 2d at 576.
55. 277 So. 2d 728 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
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in disregard of valid sound reasons to the contrary.5"
In Adrouny v. International City Bank & Trust Co.,-" a possible
extension or enlargement of a non-conforming use of bank property
was subjected to judicial review by adjoining property owners. Con-
struction of drive-through TV tellers on an adjacent parking lot was
held not to be an extension or enlargement of the non-conforming use
of the land even though it might result in more frequent use of the
parking lot. An allegation that the construction constituted a nuis-
ance was rejected.56
56. Id. at 730.
57. 266 So. 2d 524 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
58. Id. at 525.
